8(b) (1) (A) LIMITATIONS UPON THE RIGHT
OF A UNION TO FINE ITS MEMBERS
In 1947, shortly after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, Professor Archibald Cox
predicted:
The scope and variety of the foregoing problems suggest
that Section 8(b) (1) may plunge the [National Labor Relations] Board into a dismal swamp of uncertainty. Its vagueness alone, not to mention the broad interpretations put upon
it during the debates in Congress, encourages the filing of
great numbers of charges as weapons in fighting the unionization of a plant. A long period of uncertainty and heavy
volume of litigation will be necessary before the questions of
interpretation can be resolved.'
The accuracy of this prophecy was recognized by the court in the
recent case of Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc.
v. NLRB,2 in which the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether
section 8(b) (1) (A) 3 prohibited a union from fining those of its members who exceeded production ceilings set down in the union rules.
The court, quoting the above passage, successfully circumvented the
issue: ' "These are matters which are not spelled out in the Act, and
we have been unable to find any authoritative decisions which will
furnish us answers. .

.

. Fortunately we find it unnecessary to solve

these problems." 5 Notwithstanding the difficulty of the task, the relationship between section 8(b) (1) (A) and union fines must be spelled
out by the courts. A sizable body of litigation centering on this
question is arising, 6 and it is evident that some answers will soon begin
to appear. The purpose of this Comment is to discover the answer
1 Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Hv.
L. REv. 1, 33 (1947).
2 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
3 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat.

141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).

4 For the ground upon which the case was decided, see text accompanying note
95 infra.
5 Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d
745, 751 n.9 (9th Cir. 1965).
0 These cases will be discussed in section VIII of this Comment They include:
Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept 13, 1965, rev'd on rehearing, 358 F.2d 656 (7th
Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3110 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966) (No. 216);
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) ; H. B. Roberts,
148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Local 283, UAW
(Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), appeal docketed sub nora.
Scofield v. NLRB, No. 14698, 7th Cir., June 24, 1964.
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most consistent with the words of section 8(b) (1) (A) and its purpose
(as evidenced by the legislative history) ; to evaluate the compatibility
of this answer with other sections of the statute, other labor legislation
and court decisions on analogous problems; to discern the desirability
of this answer in light of the burdens it will place on the parties; and
finally, to compare this answer with those which the National Labor
Relations Board ' and the courts are beginning to articulate.

I. THE ScOPE OF THE QUESTION
Section 8(b)(1) (A) states that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization
to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein .
8...'
It is thus apparent that any inquiry into the effect of section
8(b) (1) (A) upon the right of a union to fine its members must be
limited to fines connected with the exercise of section 7 rights. In
the original act, adopted in 1935, these rights of employees included:
"the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." ' However, in adding section 8(b) (1) (A) in 1947, Congress also amended
section 7 to give employees the correlative right "to refrain from any
or all of such [section 7] activities." 10 In considering the relationship
between section 8(b) (1) (A) and union fines, discussion will therefore
be limited to those fines which restrict the union member's rights, as
an employee, to engage in or refrain from the above activities. Most
such fines are imposed because of the member's exercise of the right
to refrain from "concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual
aid or protection.""
7
The National Labor Relations Board will hereinafter be referred to as "the
Board."
8 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat.

141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
9 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
10 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
This right to refrain from union activity was restricted
by the statute to the extent that a union shop clause (requiring union membership
within thirty days of becoming employed) might require the employee to join the
union.
11 For example, a union might impose a fine for refusal to join in a strike, to
serve on a picket line or to observe union production ceilings.
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Further analysis of the problem will demonstrate that the appropriate inquiry is even narrower in scope,' but, at this point, it is
sufficient to state the question at issue as follows: Does a union fine,
imposed upon a member-employee for refraining from concerted union
activity, "coerce" or "restrain" such member-employee in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by section 7f
II. THE TEXT OF THE SECTION

The obvious result of an examination of the text of the section is
the observation that fines are nowhere mentioned. It is therefore
necessary to proceed to an examination of the objectives or purposes of
the section. 3 Eventually this step leads to a search of the legislative
history and closely related sections, but initially it involves an attempt
to discern the purpose of the section from the words themselves-in
the context of the present problem, does the language of section
8(b) (1) (A) evince a purpose which would be fulfilled by the inclusion of union fines within its prohibition? To answer this question,
careful scrutiny must be given to the words "to restrain or coerce,"
and to the proviso as to union rules concerning the acquisition and
retention of membership.
Although it would not seem to strain the meaning of "coerce" to
subsume under it the economic compulsion of a fine,' such an interpretation might be questioned on two grounds. First of all, fines may
not have the physical characteristics thought necessary to constitute
coercion, i.e., perhaps something akin to physical violence is required.
Secondly, fines may not be coercive because, upon becoming union
members, employees may implicitly submit themselves to the fining
power of the union. This latter theory could also be phrased as a
"waiver" by the employee of his section 7 rights.
The second phrase of the section from which the purpose and
objectives of the statute can be discerned is the proviso. While the
proviso makes clear that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not intended to
interfere with union discipline through suspension or expulsion from
membership, the question remains whether union fines also receive
the proviso's protection. It seems that some union fines definitely do.
Assume that a union has a bylaw that any member who fails to participate in a strike is subject to a fifty dollar fine. The bylaw further
states that if the member fails to pay the fine within thirty days, he
will be expelled from the union but that no other action will be taken
against him. A member violates this bylaw and is fined. He pays
12 See text accompanying note 19 infra.
13 This two-step analysis--examination of the text of the statute followed by a
consideration of the objectives or purpose of the statute-is adopted and implemented
in MISHKIN & MoaIS, ON LAw ix CoURTs ch. 4 (1965).
14 See, e.g., the definition of the word in MmRIAM-WmSTER, THUUJ NEW IxnmRNATIONAL DicTiONARY 438 (1961) : "to compel to an act or choice by force, threat or
other pressure ... ..
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the fine and files an 8.(b) (1) (A) charge with the Board, alleging
that he was coerced in the exercise of section 7 activities. Positing
that a fine does have the necessary attributes of coercion and that the
union member has not waived his section 7 rights, has the union
violated section 8(b) (1) (A), or is such conduct sheltered by the
proviso? It would seem that the proviso applies to this situation.
The member was not coerced by the imposition of the fine because
he did not have to pay it. He was coerced by the alternative to
payment-expulsion-a consequence which is expressly covered by
the proviso.' 5
The above hypothetical demonstrates that the real issue is not
whether the imposition of fines is coercive, since the imposition exerts
no more than social pressure; 16 rather, the question is whether the
means of enforcement of the fine is coercive within the meaning of
the statute.'7 The hypothetical illustrated one means of enforcement
-- expulsion-which was excluded from the coverage of section
8(b) (1) (A) even if coercive. Suspension from membership should
receive the same treatment. A third method-inducement of the
employer to discriminate against the member for failure to pay-is
an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (2) even if it is not coercive
under section 8(b) (1) (A).'s A final nonviolent means of enforcement
is the use of legal compulsion to force payment. In a sense, this
brings us back to the question whether fines themselves are coercive,
on the theory that the coercive aspect (if any) inheres in the payment
of the fine rather than in the enforcement itself.
15 It should be noted, however, that even if the union is operating under a union
shop clause (requiring continued membership as a condition of employment), § 8
(b) (2), in conjunction with § 8(a) (3), prohibits the union from forcing the employer
to discharge an employee whom it expels for failure to pay a fine; a union shop clause
may be used only to compel payment of "periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required." Section 8(a) (3), 61 Stat 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1964) ; § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964) ;
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954), quoted in text accompanying
note 57 infra; see note 18 infra.
16 It is here assumed that if no pressure is brought to bear upon a member to pay
an imposed fine other than ostracism by his fellow members, the member is not
coerced. That social pressure does not constitute coercion within the meaning of the
section is borne out by the legislative history. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
17 Professors Cox and Bok, in their casebook on labor law, raise the issue of
means of enforcement They pose this question for discussion:
A union could conceivably attempt to discipline its members by either expelling them from the union, demanding that they pay a prescribed fine or
suffer expulsion, or seeking to collect a fine imposed by union rules through
legal proceedings. In determining the union's right to discipline its members
under Section 8(b) (1), should anything turn on which of these methods the
union has employed?
Cox & Box, CASES ON LABOR LAW 1012 (6th ed. 1965). As will be seen in the discussion of current litigation in section VIII of this Comment, this has not always
been treated as the crucial issue.
18 Section 8(a) (3) prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees
so as to encourage or discourage union membership; § 8(b) (2) prohibits a union
from causing an employer so to discriminate. Section 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964); § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (2) (1964).
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Since the legitimacy of all nonviolent means of enforcement except
one (legal compulsion) has already been determined, the issue narrows
to whether court-enforceable fines are coercive within the meaning of
section 8(b) (1) (A)."' However, some clarification is necessary. The
issue is not really whether the fine is capable of being enforced through
court procedures but rather whether the fined employee is induced 0 to
refrain from exercising his section 7 rights by a justifiable belief that
the courts may force him to pay. Thus, in any case where the means
which the union might use to collect the fine is not clear, it is necessary
to inquire whether the fined member believed that court enforcement
would be implemented by the union and, if so, whether it is justifiable
to hold the union responsible for such a belief. Deciding this latter
question-whether it is justifiable to hold the union responsible for
a member's reasonable belief that he will be legally compelled to pay
the fine--is difficult if there is no evidence that the union induced in
the member such a belief. 1 The better view seems to be to hold that
the union must demonstrate that it has made clear to its members the
manner in which its fines would be enforced rather than to hold that a
fined member must demonstrate that the union intended that he believe
court enforcement would be used. When a union fines a member for
refraining from concerted activities, it certainly intends to discourage
such abstention; and, since coercion or restraint are prohibited under
section 8(b) (1) (A), it does not seem too great a burden to require
:9 Concededly, finding court-enforceable fines to be within the proscription of the
section produces a rather incongruous result when compared with the conclusion that
fines enforced only through expulsion are permissible. This is especially so when the
economic loss resulting from termination of membership (such as loss of a union
pension) is greater than the amount of the fine. However, there are several grounds
upon which this incongruity can be at least partially explained. First of all, complete
freedom in this sphere was specifically granted to the union in the statute and must
have been intended to give unions a high degree of control over its members. The
fact that, in some cases, this freedom may be greater than that obtainable through
an illegal means of discipline is purely coincidental and not necessarily undesirable.
Secondly, as will be pointed out later in this Comment, see text accompanying notes
54-60 infra, a union "member" in a union shop has not made a free choice in joining
the union (which action exposes him to fines), whereas the union shop requirements
do not extend to participating in benefit programs (such as pension plans). Therefore, in the latter case, the member has always entered into such a plan voluntarily,
realizing that his rights may be terminated at any time through loss of membership.
Where the member has also joined the union completely voluntarily, the argument
is equally strong that he should be held to have submitted himself to its fining power,
and perhaps an exception to any general rule to the contrary is warranted. See

section VII infra.

'O It seems that the employee should not have to show that he was motivated
to pay the fine by the alternative of court enforcement, but that it is enough that he
reasonably believed this alternative to have existed. In other words, if the union
induces a member to pay his fine by means of a threat both to expel him and to
enforce the fine through the courts, the burden should not be on the member to
demonstrate that he was motivated by the latter threat
21
However, this problem will rarely arise. In most cases where an unfair labor
practice charge is filed against a union for fining its members, the fines will not have
been paid, and the union will have already proceeded to enforce them. Even where
a member does pay the fine and then files a charge there will usually be some evidence
as to the methods of enforcement the union threatened to use.
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the union to make clear that it is acting within the exception of the
proviso, i.e., only using the weapons of suspension or expulsion.
An examination of the words of the proviso has thus led to the
conclusion that only those fines whose enforcement a union member
reasonably believes may be compelled through legal process lie within
the proscription of the section and without the proviso. However, it
will be seen that another interpretation of the proviso has gathered all
union fines within its shelter, reasoning that the words should be read
broadly so as to envelop all internal union affairs, including all fines
and other forms of discipline.2"
The above analysis demonstrates that any examination based
solely on the text of section 8(b) (1) (A) must necessarily be inconclusive. Although the proscription of union fines is consistent with
the words of the section (including the proviso), there are three interpretations of the language of the section under which fines would not
be prohibited: fines may not have the necessary physical quality to be
coercive; union members may waive their section 7 rights upon joining the union; or the proviso may cover all internal union affairs. It
is therefore necessary to resort to an examination of the section's
legislative history in order to determine whether to accept any of the
above interpretations.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 8(b) (1) (A) was not included in the Senate bill as it
emerged from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare;' however, in a supplemental statement to the Senate report, several Senators
announced their intention to introduce a number of amendments which
had been defeated in committee, usually by a vote of seven to six.'
Since the section was proposed in this manner, and since the conference
committee adopted the Senate's version without change, discussion of
the legislative history of section 8(b) (1) (A) must be limited to the
statements made in the Senate debates.
Senator Ball introduced section 8(b) (1) (A) with the following
statement:
Mr. President, the purpose of this amendment is very
simple. It is to insert an unfair-labor practice for unions
identical with the first unfair labor practice prohibited to
employers in the present act .

...

The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that
where unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in
22

See discussion of cases in section VIII infra.

23S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 441 (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1947 LEG. HIST.].
24 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947), in 1 1947 LEG. HIsT. 456.
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practices which, if an employer indulged in them, would be
unfair labor practices, such as making threats or false promises
or false statements,
the unions also shall be guilty of unfair
25
labor practices.

This introductory statement reveals several of the themes that run
throughout the Senate debate. These themes, in turn, reveal the
objectives sought by the supporters of section 8(b) (1) (A).26
The most obvious purpose behind the introduction of the section
was to create a quid pro quo for section 8(a) (1), which made it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7." 27 Although the relative positions of the employer and the union
to the employees make some disparity between the two sections inevitable,2 this theme of equal treatment was repeatedly voiced by the
sponsors of the amendment. 9 It may well be asked how this theme
can be reconciled with the fact that the phrase "to interfere with" does
not appear in section 8(b) (1) (A) but is present in section 8(a) (1).
The words did appear in the amendment as introduced, but Senator
Ives persuaded the sponsors to delete them. He argued: "They could
easily be construed to mean that any conversation, and persuasion, any
urging on the part of any person, in an effort to persuade another to
93 CONG. REc. 4016 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. Hisr. 1018.
26 Since there is no Senate report on the section and since the House conference
report is not illuminating, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), in 1
1947 LEG. HIsT. 505, these objectives are the best available evidence of legislative
intent
27 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
28 This disparity is accurately explicated in the Board's brief in the Associated
Home Builders case:
There is considerable legislative history to support petitioner's assertion
that Section 8(b) (1) (A) was enacted as a union counterpart to the Section
8(a) (1) violation which applies to employers. But this does not mean that
all conduct which would violate Section 8(a) (1) necessarily violates Section
2

8(b) (1) (A) when committed by a union. .

.

. The obvious differences in

status between a union and an employer have always required some differentiation in the application of these counterpart provisions. For example,
it would be difficult to envisage an organizing campaign during which the
union did not solicit votes with a promise of better working conditions. Such
conduct has never been found violative of the Act, but-acknowledging the
different status of the employer-settled law bars an employer from promising
employees such improvements if they vote against the union. N.L.R.B. v.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405.
Brief for Appellee, pp. 42-43, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay,
Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965) (footnote omitted); see Cox & Box,
op. cit.
supra note 17, at 287-88.
29
E.g., 93 CONG. REc. 4023 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIsT. 1028 (remarks of
Senator Taft) :
The Board has been defining those words for 12 years, ever since it came
into existence. Its application to labor organizations may have a slightly
different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that from the point
of view of the employee the two cases are parallel.
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join a labor organization, would constitute an unfair labor practice." '0
Senator Taft, a firm supporter of the amendment, acquiesced, stating
that the deletion would have no appreciable effect." The House conference report, in one of its few references to section 8(b) (1) (A),
accords with this viewpoint.3 2
The above theme seems to indicate a congressional intent to have
the Board exercise a broad policing function over union pressures upon
employees, one analogous to that exercised over employers. A second
theme articulated by Senator Ball concerned the types of pressure to
be prohibited. His mention of "threats or false promises or false
statements" is indicative of the broad range of activities which the
sponsors intended the section to cover.33 Although such language
probably reaches beyond the limits to which the section will ever be
extended in practice,34 it vividly demonstrates that the pressure intended to be prohibited was not limited to the use of physical force.
One type of pressure definitely intended to be covered was economic
reprisal: "The Board may say, 'You can persuade them; you can put
up signs .

. but you cannot, by threat of force or threat of economic

30 93 CONG. REc. 4270 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIST. 1138.
31 Mr. President, I have consulted with the attorneys and they tell me that

elimination of the words "interfere with" would not, so far as they know,
have any effect on the court decisions. Eliminating those words would not
make any substantial change in the meaning.
93 CONG. Rac. 4271 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HisT. 1138.
32 The report stated:
In applying section 8(1) of the existing law, the Board has not held to
be unfair labor practices acts which constituted "interference" that did not
also constitute restraint or coercion. Section 8(1) of the present law is written
in broad terms, and only by long continued administrative practice has its
scope been adequately and properly defined. Concern has heretofore been
expressed as to whether such practice would carry over into a corresponding
provision of the new section 8(b) (1), and presumably because of this concern
the words "interference with" were omitted from the proposed new section.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947), in 1 1947 LEG. HisT. 547.
33 In their labor law casebook, Professors Cox and Bok discuss this broad
inclusory language used in the debates; after referring to the above remarks of Senator
Ball, they continue:
In one of the cases he [Senator Ball] cited by way of example the union had
falsely boasted that it had secured a wage increase at another plant and had
been recognized by the government as spokesman for all textile workers.
In another, the Corn Products case, the "coercion and restraint!' was the
argument made by an affiliated union that employees should support it instead
of an independent union because the lack of equal recognition by government
agencies . . . made independent unions "weak and incompetent."

In like

manner Senator Taft suggested that for a union to issue "defamatory articles
and statements" would be made an unfair labor practice. If these explanations
were to be accepted at face value, the Board would soon become involved in
censoring the exaggerated claims, emotional appeals and aggressive propaganda which are all part of our mores, especially in organizational campaigns.
But even the Senators who gave the explanations refused to accept them
without a discount. Senator Ball, for example, who had accurately summarized the Corn Products case in giving an example of coercion, agreed a
few days later that the facts he had stated involved neither coercion nor
restraint.
Cox & BoK, op. cit. supra note 17, at 289. (Footnotes omitted.)
34 See note 33 supra.
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reprisal, prevent them from exercising their right to work.' "" It
hardly seems debatable that fines, especially when payment is legally
compelled, constitute "economic reprisal." In any event, in light of
the wide scope of pressures adverted to in the Senate debates, there
seems to be no rational basis for believing that fines do not have the
necessary attributes to be coercive.
A third theme reflected in Senator Ball's remarks which runs
throughout the debates is that this amendment was primarily directed
against union organizational tactics. There is no doubt that this was
the primary concern of the sponsors of the amendment. 6 However,
it is equally clear that the sponsors were not exclusively concerned
with the organizational phase. For example, Senator Taft remarked:
If there is anything clear in the development of labor union
history in the past 10 years it is that more and more labor
union employees have come to be subject to the orders of
labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right of protest
against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some
of the labor union leaders.
Mr. President, I think it is fair to say that in the case
of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of
an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select
his labor-union leader; and even if he has that opportunity
and even if there is a fair election in a union, the man who is
elected may have been voted against by various of the employees who did not desire to have that particular man elected
as the union leader. In such cases the very fact that they
did vote against that man is often used later by the union as
a means of coercing such employees ....

37

That the amendment would cover union members as well as nonmember employees during the organizational phase was also apparent
to Senator Pepper, a member of the opposition: "This amendment is
an effort to protect the workers against their own leader, chosen by
them under their own constitution and bylaws." 38 Senator Pepper
tried to draw an analogy to a corporation, where minority stockholders are not protected against intimidation by the directors. In
reply to these insistent remarks, Senator Taft continually played down
coercion of union members and emphasized protection of all em35

Taft).

93 CONG. REc. 4436 (1947),

in 2 1947 LEG. HIsT. 1206 (remarks of Senator

36 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4433, 4434 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIST. 1200, 1203
(remarks of Senator Ball).
3793 CONG. REc. 4023 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HiST. 1028.
38 93 CONG. REc. 4023 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HisT. 1029.
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ployees. However, he always maintained the position that union
members were covered by section 8(b) (1) (A).31 Thus, although the
protection of union members might have been a secondary purpose
of the section, the fact remains that it was a purpose. This coverage
of union members under the section is completely inconsistent with
any argument to the effect that union members waive their section 7
rights upon becoming members.
A final theme running through the Senate debates concerns the
breadth of the proviso, i.e., whether the proviso was intended to include
only rules relating directly to the acquisition or retention of membership, or whether it was to encompass other rules regulating the
administration of union affairs. More specifically, the issue is whether
it was intended to protect such union disciplinary measures as fines.
The proviso was not part of section 8 (b) (1) (A) as originally offered
by Senator Ball, but was introduced by Senator Holland after he had
discussed with Senators Taft and Ball "how seriously, if at all, .
[section 8(b) (1) (A)] would affect the internal administration of a
labor union." 40 Senator Holland continued:
Apparently it is not intended by the sponsors of the
amendment to affect at least that part of the internal administration which has to do with the admission or the expulsion of
members, that is with the question of membership.
In other words

.

.

.

the inserted words would make it

clear that the pending amendment would have no application
to or effect upon the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules of membership either with respect to beginning
or terminating membership.'
These remarks by the author of the proviso seem to indicate that
it should be limited to its literal language, i.e., to ensuring that the
union would be completely free to choose or expel its members. That
Congress intended to effectuate this limitation is equally clear in the
union shop provisions, sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), and in the
debates on these provisions.4 It certainly is not apparent from the
89 The replies of Senator Taft to Senator Pepper included the following:
Mr. President, let me point out that the amendment protects men who may
not be members of unions at all. In fact, many of these cases of coercion are
cases in which there never has been a certification of a union ....
Coercion is not merely against union members; it may be against all
employees.
93 CONG. REc. 4023, 4024 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG.. HisT. 1029, 1030.
40 93 CoNG. REc. 4271 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIST. 1139.
4193 CONG. REc. 4271, 4272 (1947), in 2 1947 LEa. HIsT. 1139, 1141.
42 As explained in note 15 supra, these sections prohibit a union operating under
a union shop clause from causing the discharge of a member expelled for any reason
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remarks of Senator Holland that Congress intended to refrain from
interfering with all union disciplinary policies. Furthermore, such an
interpretation would seem contrary to the clear intent of Congress to
protect union members under section 8(b) (1) (A).' Were a union
completely unfettered in disciplining its members, one might ask how
any protection would be given to union members under the section.
Further support for a narrow interpretation of the proviso and
for protecting union members under the section can be found in
Senator Wiley's general remarks upon the Senate bill:
Third. None of these provisions interferes unduly with
union affairs, except to the extent necessary to protect the
individual rights of employees. I stress individual rightsthe individual rights of the employee who also is an
American citizen, and who, even if he gets mixed up with
racketeers, is entitled to our consideration and our defense.'
However, doubt is cast upon this interpretation from a most
unusual source--Senator Ball, who had originally introduced section
8(b) (1) (A). In accepting Senator Holland's proviso, he stated:
"[T] he amendment . . . is perfectly agreeable to me.

It was never

the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere
with the internal affairs or organization of unions." 45 Later he
stated, concerning the proviso:
That modification is designed to make it clear that we
are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a union
which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is
the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort
to organize unorganized employees. However, the proviso
would not go so far as to permit the union to adopt rules auother than nonpayment of dues, but they do not interfere with the union's right to
expel the member. Senator Taft made this clear in the Senate debates:
The pending measure [the union shop provisions] does not propose any
limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They still will be
able to fire any members they wish to fire, and they will be able to try any
of their members. All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment of
this bill, is this: If they fire a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and
throw him out of work. That is the only result of the provision under discussion.
93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIsT. 1097.
43This intent is evident in the legislative history previously referred to in the text.
The intent of Congress to protect union members from union discipline is specifically
written into the second union unfair labor practice. Section 8(b) (2) protects all
employees:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
...
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section . . ..
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
44 93 CONG. R1c. 5001 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIST. 1472.
45 93 CoNG. Ryc. 4272 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HisT. 1141.
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thorizing its agents to threaten and coerce nonunion members
in an effort to persuade them to join. The modification
covers the requirements and standards of membership in the
union itself.4"
Thus Senator Ball seems to have envisioned a broader scope for the
proviso than that described by Senator Holland, who introduced this
amendment. He does not say that union members are not protected
under the section, but he does focus his concern on the nonunion
employee during the organizational phase. Perhaps this can be explained in part by the fact that this does seem to have been the main
purpose of the section. However, to the extent that an inference of
noncoverage of union members can be drawn from Senator Ball's
remarks, they seem irreconcilable with many statements of Senator
Taft.47
Before the legislative history of section 8(b) (1) (A) was consulted, three interpretations of the section under which union fines
would not be covered were enumerated. The legislative history, with
the possible exception of the above remarks of Senator Ball, has
proved to be incompatible with all these theories. First, fines definitely
possess the necessary attributes to be coercive within the meaning of
the section. Secondly, since union members are protected by the
section, it does not seem possible to hold that they waive their section 7
rights upon joining the union. The only confusion in the legislative
history is over the breadth of the proviso. Senator Ball's remarks
do indicate that the proviso covers internal union affairs. From this
it could be inferred that all union discipline is protected. However,
such reasoning is incompatible with the above-stated conclusion that
union members are protected by the section. As was pointed out before,
were the proviso to cover all union discipline, union members would
receive no protection whatsoever under the section. Since the legislative history clearly demonstrates that union members are protected
and since Senator Ball never denied this, his broad reference to internal
union affairs should be read in light of the purpose to which his
remarks were directed-an assurance that he, as sponsor of the
section, had no objection to having the proviso added. Viewed in
CoNG. Ryc. 4433 (1947), in 2 1947 LEG. HIST. 1200.
47This seeming inconsistency might have contributed to the doubts at least one
Senator had as to the effectiveness of the proviso:
It appears to me that by prohibiting unions from interfering with the employees' exercise of their rights relating to the selection of representatives, and
in the next sentence stating that such a prohibition shall not impair the right
of a union to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership, we are outlining the boundaries of a legalistic battlefield which
may lead to unlimited argument.
93 CONG. RE . 5005 (1947), in 2 1947 LE. HiST. 1479 (remarks of Senator Hatch).
4693
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this context, his use of the words "internal union affairs" can be
explained as a misstatement and as referring only to union rules with
respect to acquisition or retention of members."
Certainly this explanation is most consistent not only with the words of the statute
but also with the intent expressed by the author of the proviso,
Senator Holland.
A tentative answer to the query posed at the beginning of this
Comment is now possible. The words of the section as well as its
purpose as revealed by the legislative history lead to the conclusion
that union fines which the member reasonably believes might be enforced through legal proceedings fall within the prohibition of section
8(b) (1) (A). However, the factors which limit the conclusiveness
of this answer must be kept in mind. Nowhere in the legislative
history is there a statement that such fines are prohibited by the section.
The most that can be said is that these fines seem to fall within the
reason for the rule and therefore within the "intention of the statute." 4
A further problem is the limited reliability of the legislative history
relating to this section. Since the section was added to the bill as
proposed by the Senate committee and received scant attention in the
conference report, reliance must be exclusively on the Senate debates,
a notably inferior source of legislative history.50 Nevertheless, in the
present case the only committee work was that of the conference
committee. Since the report of this committee is unrevealing, it is
necessary to use the best material available. While this material isat most-evidence of the intent of only one-half of Congress, it is
indicative of the viewpoints of those who introduced and actively
debated the section. To the extent that Congress had any "intent"
at all regarding this section, the Senate debates best reveal that intent.
48 Of course, it is conceivable that the proviso could cover more than rules directly
relating to acquisition or retention of membership and yet less than all internal union
affairs. However, there seems to be no rational basis for drawing a line at any
particular point between these two extremes.
4o For an analysis of the reasoning behind the use of this language, see Fu.LER,
THE MoRA.iTY oF LAW 83-87 (1964).
50 The inferiority of this source is pointed out in the following passage:

Yet, while members of Congress formally vote for or against these words, it
is highly unrealistic to assume that each legislator has a detailed understanding

of what those words specifically encompass ....
Most votes are cast in terms of what is understood to be the central general
purpose of the proposed legislation. .

. .

[M]ost votes on pending legislation

are determined by no more knowledge than of this central core of the general
purpose of the proposed statute.

The detailed work of Congress is carried on in committees, and rarely is
much close attention paid to the sense in which the language of bills is used
outside of committee consideration. Moreover, Congress usually relies on the
committee's work .

. .

. The "intent of Congress" as to the details of enacted

legislation will generally be found-if it can be found at all-somewhere in
committee work.
MrSHKIN & MoRRis, ON LAW IN CouRTs 404-05 (1965).
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THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

The tentative conclusion derived from the words of the statute
and the legislative history should now be tested against the background
of the act of which section 8(b) (1) (A) is but one integral part. The
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act, as originally adopted in
1935, was to foster collective bargaining and, collaterally, to furnish
employees with sufficient protection from employers so that they could
independently participate in such bargaining. As stated by one commentator, "the Wagner Act established the twin rights to organize
and bargain collectively and made it government policy to encourage
unionization and collective bargaining." " Unions flourished under
this governmental encouragement, and, by 1947, many observers felt
that they had become too powerful. The result was the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act):
[T] he Taft-Hartley Act was the product of diverse forcesthe off-spring, a critic might say, of an unhappy union between the opponents of all collective bargaining and the critics
of the unions' abuses of power. The former group was probably the more influential of the two in writing the TaftHartley amendments, for organized labor's unfortunate decision to oppose all legislation left its sympathetic critics in a
dilemma."2
The purpose and policy of the act, as stated in its first section, was
to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers . . . to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for

preventing the interference by either with the legitimate
rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations . . . to

define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which . . . are inimical to the general welfare, and

to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
53
disputes ....
The act retained protection of employees from employer unfair labor
practices; but, recognizing that powerful unions sometimes interfered
with the legitimate rights of employees, proscribed certain union
conduct as well. As aptly described by one commentator, "the government, instead of aiding one side, now stands in the center." 54
5

1 Cox & Box, op. cit. supra note 17, at 129.
Id. at 133.
63 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1(b), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
54
Cox & Box, op. cit. supra note 17, at 134-35.
52
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Finding that court-enforceable union fines violate section 8(b)(1) (A) seems compatible with the purposes of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Protection of only nonunion employees is certainly not
an enumerated or readily apparent policy. In fact, the existence of
such a policy becomes very unlikely if one accepts the above-mentioned
proposition that the opponents of organized labor were the most influential group in the enactment of this legislation. If these individuals
were responsible for passage of the act, their intent is certainly relevant,
and they undoubtedly intended to protect union members along with
other employees.
Perhaps the strongest argument for prohibiting these fines under
section 8(b) (1) (A) is that a contrary result would open an enormous
loophole in two other sections of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)." 5 Section 8(a) (3) makes lawful the inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of a union security clause,
requiring as a condition of continued employment that all employees become members of the union within thirty days after commencing work
for the employer. However, a proviso to the section limits this membership requirement to tendering "the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." , It is well settled that the union security clause can be
used for no other purpose than requiring that employees help bear the
financial burdens of their statutory bargaining representative. In
the words of the Supreme Court:
This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for
any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and
fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions' concern about "free riders," i.e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute
their share of financial support to such union, and gave unions
the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding
from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees
for any other reason."
If unions are permitted to require membership in the union under
a union security clause and then to use this membership as a basis
for imposing court-enforceable fines upon those who are unwilling to participate in union activities, the union security agreement
is clearly being used for a "purpose other than to compel payment of
union dues and fees." 5s This is not to say that unions operating
55 Section 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1964); § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
56 Section 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1964).
57
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
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under security agreements should not be permitted to fine their members, but only that these fines should be enforceable only through
threats of suspension or expulsion from membership. The member
fined under these latter circumstances is not compelled to pay the fine
but only to choose between obeying union rules and losing union
membership; and, if he chooses the latter, it will not result in the loss
of his job. The evil inherent in fines enforceable through legal compulsion is that the union security clause is used not only to obtain
dues payments but also to fasten upon the employee a legal obligation
to pay fines incurred for refusal to participate in union activities.
It is arguable that an employee who is a union "member" only
to the extent required by a union security clause, i.e., one who merely
is on the union rolls " and pays dues, is not subjected to the compulsion described above because this "membership" is not a sufficient
legal relationship to compel payment of union fines. This argument
rests, however, upon two unwarranted assumptions. First, most
members of a union shop will not be able to prove that upon joining
the union they did not intend to bind themselves beyond the minimal
legal requirements. A new employee is told that he must join the
union within thirty days; only the most belligerent and vociferous
employee will make a formal protest sufficient so to limit his membership and to serve as evidence of such limitation. Although the great
majority of employees will simply comply-signing the necessary
59 Some commentators have argued that, under the Union Starch doctrine, Union
Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815
(1951), employees in a union shop are not compelled to join the union at all but
merely to pay dues. Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism
in Sweden and the United States, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 647, 686 (1964) ; Toner, The
Taft-Hartley Union Shop Does Not Force Anyone To Join Union, 6 L.. L.J. 690
(1955).
However, no case, including Union Starch, has gone so far. In Union
Starch, the Seventh Circuit's statement of the case, as well as the facts, make it clear
that the employee must offer to "join" the union to the extent of being willing to
pay dues. The court stated:
The principal question involved is whether employees who request union
membership and tender initiation fees and dues, but fail to comply with other
union-imposed conditions for acquisition of membership, are protected by the
Act from discharge under the terms of a valid union security agreement.
186 F.2d at 1010. (Emphasis added.) The employees were discharged because "they
had failed to file an application card, attend a meeting of and take an oath of loyalty
to the Union," id. at 1011, and the court held this to be an unfair labor practice.
However, although the employees in this case were not willing to do much else, they
were willing to "join" the union. Any doubt that this was required of employees in
a union shop was laid to rest in a recent Supreme Court decision relating to the
validity of an "agency shop" in a right-to-work state:
Of course, if the union chooses to extend membership even though the employee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to support
or "join" the union in any other affirmative way, the employee may have to
become a "member" under a union shop contract, in the sense that the union
may be able to place him on its rolls. The agency shop arrangement proposed
here removes that choice from the union and places the option of membership
in the employee while still requiring the same monetary support as does the
union shop.
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963).
(Footnote omitted.)
It is thus apparent that it is only the agency shop and not the union shop which does
not compel membership.
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papers and paying the initiation fees-this in no way indicates that
they have voluntarily joined the union or that they would have joined
in the absence of the union security clause. Secondly, the argument
also makes the unwarranted assumption that if a member can prove
that he so limited his union membership, each and every state court
before whom an action for payment is brought will reach the same
conclusion-that such limited membership is not a relationship sufficient legally to bind the employee. To the extent that an employee
under a union shop contract is held to have "joined" the union
-whether by reason of insufficient protest at the time of joining,
lack of proof of such protest or the particular state law involvedand is therefore held liable to pay a fine, the union shop contract is
being used for a "purpose other than to compel payment of union dues
and fees." 6 To hold that section 8(b) (1) (A) permits the imposition of court-enforceable fines where the member has joined because
of a union security clause, therefore, would clearly be inconsistent
with the union shop provisions, sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2).
V.

THE

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

DISCLOSURE ACT OF

REPORTING

AND

1959

The conclusion that section 8 (b) (1) (A) prohibits court-enforceable union fines blends very well with the purposes and policies of
the whole act. It is necessary, however, to make a limited inquiry
into one further piece of labor legislation, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) 6 As
the Supreme Court has so aptly stated:
To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish
what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in
an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959
Act is a relevant consideration. Courts may properly take
into account the later Act when asked to extend the reach of
the earlier Act's vague language to the limits which, read
literally, the words might permit. We avoid the incongruous
result implicit in the Board's construction by reading
§ 8(b) (1) (A), which is only one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act, mindful of the manifest purpose of
62
the Congress to fashion a coherent national labor policy.

Thus it must be ascertained whether prohibiting court-enforceable fines
under section 8(b) (1) (A) is consistent with the terms and purposes
of the 1959 legislation.
60

Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
6173 Stat 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1964).
62 NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union, 362 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1960).
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The Landrum-Griffin Act was the first congressional attempt
to regulate directly the internal affairs of unions.6 3 This regulation
included the following:
Certain provisions required that elections be held periodically
for local and national union officers and that union members
be assured a right to vote, to nominate candidates, to run
for office, to comment upon candidates for union office, etc.
Every union member was given an equal right to attend
membership meetings and to participate in the voting and
deliberations at such meetings.64
The act contains a provision relating directly to union discipline,
section 101 (a) (5), which states that a member may not be "fined,
suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined" until he receives a
specified degree of procedural due process.6 5 This provision points
out two superficial inconsistencies between the above interpretation of
section 8(b) (1) (A) and the 1959 legislation. First, section
101(a) (5) seems to treat "fines" as a legitimate form of union
discipline. To a certain extent this is true; for the language of the
section to be meaningful, some fines must be legitimate. However,
the proposed interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A) also accepts some
fines as legitimate, proscribing only those fines imposed upon section
7 activities and enforceable through legal compulsion.
The other seeming inconsistency raises a more serious problem.
Congress did not specifically deal with internal union affairs in 1947;
when it did direct itself to internal union affairs and union discipline
63 In its Declaration of Findings, Purposes and Policy, the act states:

The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust,
corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures
to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require
further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of
the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they relate
to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants,
and their officers and representatives.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§2(b), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1964).
64 Cox & BoK, op. cit. rupra note 17, at 136-37.
65
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled,
or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization
or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with
written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense;
(C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
Another section of the act
73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §411(a) (5) (1964).
prohibits the use of the disciplinary powers enumerated above to prevent any member
from exercising any right conferred upon him by the act Section 609, 73 Stat. 541
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1964). This provision is analogous to § 8(a) (4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (4)
(1964), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee for filing charges or giving testimony under that act. Section 8(b)
(1) (A) has been held to place a corresponding proscription upon a union. Roberts
v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
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in 1959, regulation was limited to the procedural aspects of union
discipline. According to the maxim expressio unius est exciusio
alterius, this limitation in the 1959 legislation would seem to indicate
a congressional intent to abstain from regulation of the union's substantive right to fine once procedural due process has been furnished.
However, this result does not necessarily follow. While it is true
that congressional concern in enacting section 8(b)(1) (A) of the
1947 act was primarily with protecting employee rights rather than
the rights of union members vis-A-vis the union, this does not indicate
that Congress intended to restrict the protection of section 7 rights
when to provide such protection would impinge upon internal union
affairs. When a union member is protected in the exercise of his
section 7 rights, any ensuing regulation of internal union affairs is
purely incidental.6 6 Any suggestion that section 101 (a) (5) of the
1959 act bars all applications of section 8(b) (1) (A) which would
have this incidental effect is dispelled by section 103 of the 1959 act:
"Nothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies
of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal
law .

.

.

."

"

Thus on closer inspection the proscription of court-

enforceable union fines under section 8(b) (1) (A) is not incompatible
with the 1959 legislation. The 1947 legislation creates an incidental
regulation over the power of unions to levy some fines, while the 1959
act regulates the procedural aspects of all union fines.
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF RELATED COURT DECISIONS

It has been seen that holding court-enforceable fines violative of
section 8(b) (1) (A) is compatible with both the Labor Management
Relations Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act. It remains to be seen
6 One may question whether the prohibition of court-enforceable union fines is
really a regulation of internal union affairs at all. If a union member is fined for
working during a strike or exceeding production ceilings and is legally compelled
to pay the fine, it seems that he is being affected in his employment, rather than in his
union, relationship. See quotation in text accompanying note 119 infra. On the other
hand, if he is expelled or suspended from the union for failure to pay such a fine,
it is solely an internal union matter and is exempted from § 8(b) (1) (A) by the
express words of the proviso.
6773 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §413 (1964). A further demonstration that
the 1959 legislation was not intended to change the substantive rights of a union to
discipline its members is found in the legislative history. Representatives Landrum
and Griffin, sponsors of the act, both assured Congress that the proviso to § 8(b) (1)
(A) would not be affected. In the words of Representative Griffin:
The labor reform legislation before the House at this time is directed at the
regulation of the internal affairs of unions. It does not touch or deal in any
way with the admission to, or retention of, membership in a union. There is
a proviso in the Taft-Hartley Act which union leaders and the union members

want preserved.

I refer to a proviso to Section 8(b) .

.

..

I personally

think that in some instances this privilege has been abused by some unions.
However, our committee did not go into that matter in its hearings ...
[It] is outside of the scope of the legislation and the hearings that were held
on labor reform legislation.
105 CoNG. REc. 15722-23 (1959), in 2 NLRB, LEisrATIVE HIsTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLosuRE AcT oF 1959, at 1649 (1959).
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whether this interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A) is in accord with
court decisions 6 on related problems.
A. Waiver of Rights
The theory that an employee waives his section 7 rights upon
becoming a union member has already been discussed. The Supreme
Court has stated that a statutory bargaining representative may effectively waive the employee's right to strike in a collective bargaining
agreement: "Provided the selection of the bargaining representative
remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce
and to the maintenance of regular production schedules." 69 It seems
that this result is necessary in order to further the basic purposes of
the National Labor Relations Act. The employee was given the right
to strike in order to strengthen his ability to bargain collectively; "'
when this object has been fulfilled, it seems perfectly consistent to
remove that right for the duration of the contract. There are no
such compelling reasons for taking away all of an employee's section
7 rights when he joins a union. In any event, the Supreme Court
has not evidenced any tendency so to broaden the waiver theory.
B. Exclusive Federal7 ' Jurisdiction
Under the rule of Garner v. Teamsters Union," the Supreme
Court has held that state courts cannot regulate union activity which
"arguably" violates section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,73 a union
member sued in a state court, alleging expulsion contrary to the union
constitution and bylaws and seeking damages and reinstatement. His
damages resulted from being unable to obtain employment because of
loss of membership. The Supreme Court held that action by the state
court was proper in this case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter admitted:
68The discussion in this section will be limited to court decisions since the position
of the Board on the specific issue under discussion is now clear. See section VIII
infra.
69
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956). (Italics in original.)
70 The policy behind the 1935 legislation, § 7 of which protected the employee
in his right to strike, was stated as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . .
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 49 Stat 449 (1935).
71 As used herein, "Federal" encompasses the National Labor Relations Board,
with appeal to the United States courts of appeals and certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.

72346 U.S. 485 (1953).
73 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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[I]t might be abstractly justifiable, as a matter of wooden
logic, to suggest that an action in a state court by a member
of a union for restoration of his membership rights is precluded. In such a suit there may be embedded circumstances
that could constitute an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(b) (2) of the Act. . . . But the protection of union
members in their rights as members from arbitraryconduct
by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by fed-

eral law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has been
expressly denied. 74
He then quoted from the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A). The italicized language above has been used to argue that section 8 (b) (1) (A)
does not proscribe union fines. 75 However, the context in which this
language is used makes it perfectly clear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
was referring only to the lack of regulation over the union's right to
suspend or expel its members and not to its complete freedom in
76
matters of union discipline.
A more recent Supreme Court decision, Local 100, United Ass'n
of Journeymen v. Borden,7" explained the Gonzales decision as follows:
The Gonzales decision, it is evident, turned on the Court's
conclusion that the lawsuit was focused on purely internal
union matters, i.e., on relations between the individual plaintiff and the union not having to do directly with matters of
employment, and that the principal relief sought was restora78
tion of union membership rights.

In Borden, on facts very similar to Gonzales,7 the Court held that the
state suit was barred because "the suit involved here was focused
principally, if not entirely, on the union's actions with respect to
Borden's efforts to obtain employment." " But Borden is extremely
relevant here for another reason. Borden was a union member, and
the Court held that the relevant provision of the National Labor
74Id. at 619-20. (Emphasis added.)
75 Brief for Appellee, p. 25, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay,
Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Brief for Appellee, p. 25, Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, No. 14853, 7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1965.
71sFor a discussion of the question whether fines affect members in their employment rights rather than in their rights as members, see note 66 supra.
77 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
78 Id. at 697.
79
Borden, a union member, after tentatively getting a job on a construction
project, was denied referral by the union (hiring was done through union referral).
He sued the union, alleging willful interference with his right to contract and breach
of the union's promise not to discriminate in referral among members. Id. at 691-92.
80 Id. at 697.
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Relations Act was section 8(b) (1) (A)."' Here, then, is a specific
affirmance of the position that union members are protected under
this section.
C. Violations of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
82
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union,
has held that peaceful picketing by a minority union for the purpose
of immediate recognition does not violate section 8(b) (1) (A).'
The decision hinged on considerations pertaining to the particular
conduct involved:
In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has
dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the
clearest indication in the legislative history of § 8 (b) (1) (A)
supporting the Board's claim of power under that section,
we cannot sustain the Board's order here."
However, some language in the opinion treats the kind of conduct
which is coercive under the section rather narrowly: "The note repeatedly sounded [in the legislative history] is as to the necessity for
protecting individual workers from union organizational tactics tinged
with violence, duress, or reprisal." 85 This language has been used to
argue that conduct such as the imposition of fines is excluded from the
proscription of the section."" Such an argument ignores later language
in the opinion:
[T]he central theme of [the debate] . . . was not the curtailment of the right peacefully to strike . . . but the elimination

or inof the use of repressive tactics bordering on violence
8
volving particularized threats of economic reprisal. 7
Notwithstanding the state court's contrary view, if it is assumed that the
refusal and the resulting inability to obtain employment were in some way
based on respondent's actual or believed failure to comply with internal
union rules, it is certainly "arguable" that the union's conduct violated
§ 8(b) (1) (A), by restraining or coercing Borden in the exercise of his
protected right to refrain from observing those rules ....
Id. at 694. (Italics in original.)
82362 U.S. 274 (1960).
3 Since this picketing was conducted within twelve months after a valid election
and was for the purpose of recognition, it would now be an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(b) (7) (B), which was added in 1959. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
81

(7) (B) (1964).

84362 U.S. at 284.

85 Id. at 286.

86 Brief for Appellee, p. 22, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay,
Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965); Brief for Appellee, p. 21, Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept. 13, 1965; Brief for Appellee, p. 26,
Scofield v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No. 14698, 7th Cir., June 28, 1964.
s'tNLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union, 362 U.S. 274, 287 (1960).
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[Section] 8(b) (1) (A) is a grant of power to the Board
limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving
violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof-conduct involving more than the general pressures upon persons
employed by the affected employers implicit in economic
strikes."'
That physical violence or even scienter are not necessary to have
an 8 (b) (1) (A) violation is demonstrated by the more recent Supreme
Court decision in International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
NLRB."9 Here the Court affirmed the finding of an 8(b) (1) (A)
violation where the union accepted exclusive bargaining authority at
a time when, in fact, it did not have the support of a majority of the
employees, although the union had a bona fide belief that it did
represent a majority.90
D. Mandatory Bargaining Subjects
Under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer or the statutory bargaining representative of
the employees to refuse to bargain collectively. 9 Section 8(d) defines
this duty as follows: "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment .

92

*."..

With regard to these mandatory bargain-

ing subjects, both the employer and the union must bargain but need
not acquiesce, i.e., they may insist to an impasse. 3 Both the Seventh
and the Ninth Circuits have held union rules levying fines to be
mandatory bargaining subjects.
In Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v.
NLRB, the Ninth Circuit avoided deciding whether the union violated
8(b) (1) (A) in fining those of its members who exceeded production
ceilings set down in the union rules by holding that it violated section
8(b) (3) in unilaterally establishing the production ceilings:
88 Id.at 290.

89 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
90 This decision supports the conclusion reached earlier in this Comment to the
effect that the union should have the burden of demonstrating that it made clear to
its members that fines would not be court-enforced. See text accompanying notes
20-21 supra. If a union can be held to have violated § 8(b) (1) (A) without any
willful action, surely this latter burden is not too severe.
9' Section 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964); § 8(b)

(3), 61 Stat 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
92 Section 8(d), 61 Stat 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).

However, insisting
93 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
to an impasse upon a non-mandatory subject is a refusal to bargain in violation of
the act. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

94 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).

70

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.115:47

The rules relating to the limitation of production are plainly
rules adopted for the purpose of establishing the terms and
conditions of employment of union members. The rule is
not directed merely to the employees; it has a direct impact
upon the employer. It fixes the conditions and terms under
95
which he may procure the services of his employees.
This case does not, however, shed much light on the 8(b) (1) (A)
issue. The court held that the proviso to this section was inapplicable,
since the union rule "was an attempt to prescribe the terms and conditions of employment and it was not confined to any purely internal
Nevertheless, its conclusion that this was
concern of the Unions." "
not a purely internal matter was based on the interest of the employer
in such a rule rather than on a concern for the union member in matters
relating to his employment relationship. By contrast, in Allen Bradley
Co. v. NLRB,9 7 the Seventh Circuit case treating union fines as a
mandatory bargaining subject, the court squarely and forcefully stated,
albeit in dictum, that fines imposed for refusing to strike were an
8(b) (1) (A) violation:
Section 7 protects an employee in his right to refrain from
concerted activities and this includes, of course, the right to
refuse to participate in or recognize a strike. Coercion or
interference with that right, whether by the employer or
by the union, is made an unfair labor practice by the terms
of the Act. So far as material to the instant situation, the
Act permits no impairment of the right of an employee to
work, with the corollary right of the employer to utilize his
services."'
In this case the union was not operating under a union shop contract.
Fourteen employees had each been fined 100 dollars by the union
for working during a strike, and local court actions had been commenced to collect the fines. The company thereafter insisted to an
impasse on a contract clause limiting the union's right to discipline
or fine its members. The Board found that the employer had refused
to bargain under section 8(a) (5) ; the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no protection for the union in the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A):
[T]here is nothing in the situation before us which indicates
that such fines bore any relation to the "acquisition or re95 Id. at 750.
96 Ibid. One apparent reason for dealing with the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) but
not with the section itself was that the court felt obliged to get without the ambit of
the proviso before finding an 8(b) (3) violation.
97286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
98 Id. at 445.
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tention of membership .

.

.

."

We assume that a union has

broad powers in prescribing rules relative to the acquisition
and retention of its members. However, that power, in our
view, is not absolute. It goes beyond any permissible limit
when it imposes a sanction upon a member because of his
exercise of a right guaranteed by the Act. Coercive action,
whether by way of fine, discharge or otherwise, which deprives a member of his right to work and his employer of the
benefit of his services, cannot be said to relate only to the
internal affairs of the union.99
It can thus be seen that this case contains very strong language to
the effect that court-enforceable union fines are violative of section
8(b) (1) (A). However, the above language also seems broad enough
completely to nullify the proviso. If by "discharge or otherwise" the
court meant to include expulsion or suspension from membership, this
dictum is clearly wrong. If the proviso covers any union rules, it
covers these. To argue that the proviso becomes inapplicable whenever the union's action coerces the member in the exercise of section 7
rights is absurd, for the proviso becomes applicable only when the
union conduct comes within section 8(b) (1) (A). Since the proviso
was certainly intended to have some application, as earlier Seventh
Circuit cases hold, 100 it seems that the above dictum should not be
read so as to exclude expulsion or suspension from membership from
the proviso's protection. 1 '
Related to the problem whether union fining is a mandatory
bargaining subject is the question of a union's right to obtain the
99 Id. at 446. Once again, as in Associated Home Builders, the court had to escape
the proviso in order to find that fines were a mandatory bargaining subject.
100 In American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782, 800 (7th
Cir. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953), the court upheld the right
of a union to expel its members:
Under this limitation [the proviso] Congress left labor organizations free to
adopt any rules they desired governing membership in their organizations.
Members could be expelled for any reason and in any manner prescribed by
the organization's rules, so far as § 8(b) (1) (A) is concerned.
In the later case of NLRB v. Local 286, UAW, 222 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955), the
court reversed the Board's finding of an § 8(b) (1) (A) violation where the union
had removed the union insurance coverage of several members who refused to pay
fines levied against them. Finding that the insurance coverage was "a benefit incidental to union membership," the court stated: "Its threatened withdrawal of the
rights of the complaining employees, as a disciplinary measure, was in full conformity
with respondent's right to regulate its internal affairs" (citing American Newspaper
PublishersAss'n). Id. at 98.
101 There is also a serious analytical problem with the broad holding in this case
that the clause limiting the union's right to fine was a mandatory bargaining subject.
If this were a mandatory subject, then it would have been permissible for the union
to insist to an impasse upon refusing to incorporate it into the agreement. But, if
it is a violation of the act for the union so to discipline its members, it then seems
that the union cannot, "in good faith," so insist. Nevertheless, if the case is limited
to its factual holding-that the employer may insist to an impasse upon the clauseit does not seem objectionable.
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employer's help, through the collective bargaining agreement, in disciplining its members. Since this would be employer discrimination
which encourages membership in the union, sections 8(a) (3) and
8(b) (2) seem to answer this question in the negative. 10 2 A case so
holding is NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp. 3 In that case the collective
bargaining agreement stated that there should be no promotion of
employees against whom union charges were pending. Charges were
pending against several union members who had returned to work
during a strike. After arbitration the employer agreed to abide by
the agreement and did not promote the employees. The Board found
not only 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) violations but also 8(a)(1) and
8 (b) (1) (A) infractions. The Second Circuit affirmed:
Section 7 gave Finch the right to take part in the strike
or not as he pleased, and if he chose not to take part in the
strike it was an unfair labor practice for either the employer
or the union to interfere with the exercise of that right.

Section 8(a) (1) and (b) (1) (A).'0 4

Here, then, is a direct holding that section 8(b) (1) (A) protects a
union member in exercising his right not to strike.

VII.

THE DESIRABILITY OF THE CONCLUSION

A survey of related cases has revealed not only that the decisions
are compatible with the conclusion reached here but also that some
of them, e.g., Borden and Bell Aircraft, seem to demand this result
and that Allen Bradley, although probably going too far, is imminently
close to a holding that court-enforceable union fines are violations of
section 8(b) (1) (A). It is now necessary to discern whether this
conclusion will have a deleterious or crippling effect upon labor
organizations.
One argument to the effect that Congress did not intend to prohibit court-enforceable union fines in 1947 is based on the premise
that unions have always fined their members; Congress knew this and
yet did not address itself specifically to the problem. While it is undoubtedly true that unions in the past have fined their members and
continue to do so, it is not at all clear that court-enforceable fines were
or are a prevalent form of union discipline. Indeed, when unions have
05
attempted to use this weapon, they have been promptly challenged.
See note 18 supra.
206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
104 Id. at 237.

102

103

105 The court-enforced fines which formed the background of the Allen Bradley
case were challenged by an 8(b) (1) (A) charge which was dismissed by the Regional
Director; the dismissal was upheld by the General Counsel. Allen Bradley Co. v.
NLRB, 286 F.2d 442, 443 (7th Cir. 1961). For other challenges of court-enforced
fines, see Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), aff'd sub norn. Allis-Chalmers
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In 1963, the Bureau of Labor Statistics made a study of disciplinary
powers and procedures in union constitutions. This study seems to
indicate that fines are much less frequently used than suspension and
expulsion."' 0
The relative effectiveness of suspension or expulsion as compared
with court-enforceable fines depends on the strength and competence
of the union involved. If the union furnishes pension and mortuary
benefits 107 or hospitalization coverage... to its members, expulsion is
a powerful weapon. If, on the other hand, the union is weak, expulsion
will damage the union more than the recalcitrant member. If effectiveness of the unionization process were the only criterion, it would seem
that only weak unions should have the power to use court-enforceable
fines to compel their members to join in union activities, since the weak
union cannot use expulsion as an effective tool. However, Congress,
in 1947, thought that compulsory unionism was another relevant consideration in determining appropriate union power. It has already
been pointed out that court-enforceable fines under a union shop
contract are antithetical to the objectives of the union shop sections
of the act.' 00 Therefore, where a weak union is operating under a
union shop contract, the policy question whether it should be allowed
to use court-enforceable fines boils down to the relative merits of
strengthening weak unions vis-A-vis protecting employees from the
leverage which a union can exert under compulsory unionism. The
current debate over repeal of section 14(b) 11 of the act demonstrates
that the policy question is not an easy one-but can there be any doubt
of Congress' verdict in 1947?
The question left unanswered in the preceding paragraph is
whether there is any valid objection, on policy grounds, to permitting
a union-at least a weak union-to use the court-enforceable fine under
a truly open shop. Hypothesizing complete freedom of choice in joining a union, an analogy to other voluntary associations could be drawn,
and there would seem to be no substantial objection to holding that
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept. 13, 1965, rev'd on. rehearing, 358 F.2d
656 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3110 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966) (No.
216); Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), appeal
docketed sb norn. Scofield v. NLRB, No. 14698, 7th Cir., June 28, 1964.
106 U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATisTics, DFP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 1350, DisciPLINARY POWERS AND PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTITUTIONS 17, Table 1H-7 (1963).
107 Such benefits were provided by the union in American Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782, 800 (7th Cir. 1951).
108 Hospitalization coverage was provided by the union in NLRB v. Local 286,
UAW, 222 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1955).
109 See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
110 Section 14(b) provides:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
61 Stat 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
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the employee, upon joining a union, assumes all of the burdens as
well as the benefits of membership. Of course, this choice can never
be absolutely free: since the union is the employee's statutory bargaining representative whether he joins or not, he forfeits his right to
participate in mapping his destiny as an employee by deciding not to
join. However, the choice is probably free enough to convince many
that where there is an open union, the employee should be held to
waive his section 7 rights and assume all the burdens of union membership along with the privileges. An even more convincing argument
is that under an open shop the employee should at least be allowed
effectively to waive his section 7 rights if he explicitly does so upon
joining the union. These arguments have a great deal of merit on
policy grounds. The difficult questions are whether a line can be
drawn which is consistent with congressional intent, and, if so,
whether this line should be drawn between union shops and open
shops or between waiver de jure and waiver de facto.
VIII. THE CURRENT LITIGATION
The above discussion has revealed that, at least in a union shop
situation, the conclusion that court-enforceable union fines are proscribed under section 8(b) (1) (A) is defensible on policy groundsspecifically, the congressional policy of limiting compulsory unionism
to financial support. As the compulsory aspect of union membership
weakens, so do the policy arguments behind the above interpretation
of section 8(b)(1)(A); and, correspondingly, the probability increases that the Board and the courts will seek to separate the particular fine from the scope of the section. It remains to be seen how
the Board and the courts have actually been treating the problem. The
position of the Board now seems relatively clear: court-enforceable
union fines do not violate section 8(b) (1) (A). Its authority for this
interpretation dates back to the 1954 Board decision in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co.: "'
We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the imposition of a $500 fine on Carpenter by the Respondent Union
for his failure to engage in certain of its activities is not
violative of Section 8(b)(1) (A) of the Act. It is well
established that the proviso to Section 8(b)(1) (A) precludes any such interference with the internal affairs of a
labor organization."'
111 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
112 Id. at 729. As authority for this proposition, the Board cited its decision
in American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949), where
the alleged violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) was expulsion from membership rather than
union fines.
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The conduct for which the petitioner was sought to be punished was
his failure to attend union meetings or perform picket duty. The
collective bargaining agreement required union membership. There
is no statement either in the trial examiner's intermediate report or
in the Board's opinion as to whether the union sought court enforcement of this fine. A conclusion that the union was powerful enough
to collect the fine without resort to the courts seems justified in light
of the trial examiner's statement that punishment was originally loss
of employment and was later reduced to the fine plus suspension
from work." 3
It was not until 1964 that this issue again came before the
Board." 4 The first of the recent cases to be heard by the Board was
Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 5 which involved a
union rule, in effect for twenty-five years, setting production ceilings
on piecework. The company did not consider itself bound by this
rule but had, in the past, bargained over it. The collective bargaining
agreement contained a union security clause whereby employees could
pay the union a "service fee" in lieu of membership. Certain union
members were fined for exceeding the ceilings, and court actions were
commenced to compel payment. In finding no 8(b) (1) (A) violation,"" the majority of the Board described the union's disciplinary
measures as internal union affairs and relied heavily upon a congressional intent not to regulate these affairs under section 8(b) (1) (A).
The Board arrived at its decision without the aid of the proviso:
"Section 8(b) (1) (A) was not intended to reach the conduct here
involved, even without regard to the purpose of the proviso, because,
as is pointed out, it was not the kind of activity with which Section
8(b) (1) (A) was concerned." 117 However, the Board did state that
113 When Carpenter returned to work, he was dropped to the bottom of the
seniority list with the result that his income was reduced. The Board held that this
drop in seniority and the suspension from work were violations of § 8(b) (1) (A) as
well as § 8(b) (2). 109 N.L.R.B. at 728-29.
114 The dismissal of the union fine charge which preceded the Allen Bradley case

is discussed in note 105 supra.
315 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), appeal docketed sub nor . Scofield v. NLRB, No.
14698, 7th Cir., June 28, 1964.
116The Board refused to accept the General Counsel's attempted distinction of
Minneapolis Star: "We do not agree with the General Counsel that there is an implication in the Board's decision in that case that the imposition of the fine was
collectible only by threat of expulsion." Id. at 1103 n.12. However, the trial examiner,
although reaching the same result as the Board, seems to have agreed with the
General Counsel's interpretation of this earlier case:
I had assumed that the Government's theory of liability was based, as in such
case it would have had to be, solely on the single factual variance of this case
from Minneapolis Star, namely that the union here did not assess the fine
as an added condition of membership under penalty of expulsion if not paid,
but as a debt asserted as collectible without regard to retention of membership
Id. at 1114.
117Id. at 1101. The Board based this conclusion on that portion of the legislative history indicating a desire not to interfere with "internal union affairs" and
a concern only with organizing tactics of unions.
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the effect of the proviso should not be limited to fines collectible only
through threat of expulsion. The fact that membership was not
compulsory was evidently important to the decision: "The Charging
Parties are all members of the Union, who, by their decision to join,
have elected to subject themselves commonly with other union members to union regulation and discipline." 18 In the course of the
opinion, the Board found it necessary to repudiate the Seventh
Circuit's Allen Bradley decision, stating that it was in conflict with
an earlier Seventh Circuit case. Member Leedom filed a strong
dissent:
[T]he economic pressure inherent in a fine is not unlike the
pressure caused by the threat of loss of employment which
has always been recognized as economic "intimidation" or
"reprisal" constituting a violation . ...
In my opinion,
there is little difference between a union's causing the discharge of an employee for refraining from engaging in
concerted activity, and a union's fining an employee the
partial, or total, equivalent of his salary ....
"
Although Wisconsin Motor was the first of the recent union fine cases
to be passed on by the Board, it has been delayed by a procedural issue
which took it to the Supreme Court; 120 it is now pending before the
Seventh Circuit for a hearing on the merits.
The next case to reach the Board was Associated Home
Builders,'12 which also involved fines for exceeding production
standards, but there the union had applied union dues to payment of
the fines instead of using court proceedings. Since the union was
operating under a strict union shop contract,2 2 this disciplinary
measure seriously impaired the job status of the fined members. If
they failed to pay extra dues, they could lose their jobs. The Board
accordingly found that the application of dues payments to fines was
an 8(b) (1) (A) violation, and this determination was not contested
upon appeal. However, the Board relied on Wisconsin Motor in
holding that the fines, standing apart from application of dues, did
not violate the section. The Ninth Circuit's avoidance of this issue
18 Id. at 1099.
19 Id. at 1107 n.24.
1o Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).

The Seventh Circuit
denied the union's motion to intervene upon appeal, authorizing it to file a brief
amicus curiae without leave to participate in oral argument. The Supreme Court
reversed, allowing intervention.
121 Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay. Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1965).
2Brief for Appellant, App., p. 3, Associated Home Builders of the Greater
East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
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Whether the court would have
upon appeal is discussed above.'
been less reluctant to decide the issue had the union attempted to
collect the fines through court proceedings must remain a matter
of speculation.
In its next two decisions, the Board proceeded to muddy the
waters by holding certain union fines violative of section 8 (b) (1) (A).
In Local 138, Int'l Union of OperatingEngrs,'4 a union member was
fined for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board before
exhausting his internal union remedies. Although, as in Associated
Home Builders, the fine was tied to union dues, the Board did not
rest on this narrow ground:
There can be no doubt that a fine is by nature coercive, and
that the imposition of a fine by a labor organization upon a
member who files charges with the Board does restrain and
coerce that member in the exercise of his right to file
charges. The union's conduct is no less coercive where the
filing of the charges is alleged to be in conflict with an
internal union rule or policy and the fine is imposed allegedly
to enforce that internal policy. Thus, we find that the fine
imposed upon Skura herein is in clear conflict with Section
by the proviso
8(b) (1) (A) . . . unless immunized
125
policy.
Federal
other
or some

The Board, finding no such limitation, distinguished the Wisconsin
Motor decision as follows:
There, unlike the instant case, the Board was dealing with a
union rule which in the circumstances of that case did not
run counter to other recognized public policies and, therefore,
was not beyond the competence of the union to adopt and
enforce. .

.

. By the rule under consideration here, how-

ever, Respondent attempted to regulate its members' access
to the Board's processes. Considering the overriding public
interest involved, it is our opinion that no private organization should be permitted to prevent or regulate access to the
Board .

126

The fact situation in Local 138 involved an important LandrumGriffin Act problem, 27 and it was not long before its companion case,
1 3See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
"A 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
M2Id. at 682. (Footnote omitted.)
126 Ibid.
12 7 Section 101 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act

of 1959 provides, inter alia, that a union may not limit the right of a member to
institute an action before the Board, but with the proviso that "any such member
may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a
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H. B. Roberts,2 ' reached the D. C. Circuit. Roberts involved the same
fact situation as Local 138 and was decided in the same way by the
Board. The court upheld the Board's finding of an 8(b) (1) (A)
violation: "That a fine such as here imposed is restraint or coercion in
the ordinary meaning of those terms is clear." 129 However, in seeming
accord with the Board's distinguishing of Wisconsin Motor in Local
138, the court limited its holding as follows:
We limit our approval of the Board's construction of its
powers to the case before us, where the fine was not imposed
because of the member's harassing conduct as a member, but,
as the case is presented to us, simply because he filed the
charges or
did so without pursuing possible internal
30
remedies.1

four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations .....
" 73 Stat. 522 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964). In deciding a companion case to Local 138, the D.C.
Circuit explained the inapplicability of § 101 (a) (4) to § 8(b) (1) (A) violations as
follows:
This statute, speaking roughly, parallels rather than meshes into the preexisting Acts insofar at least as the latter proscribe unfair labor practices of
either employers or labor organizations. Thus considered it would seem that
Section 101 (a) (4) has little bearing one way or the other upon the right of
the Board by its traditional methods to preclude coercion upon one seeking
its protection . . . . This fortifies our agreement with the Board that the
proviso to Section 101 (a) (4) does not legalize a coercive fine imposed upon
a member by a labor organization for his failure to exhaust internal remedies
for four months before filing an unfair labor practice charge against his union.
The proviso does authorize, indeed it may require, the agency or court to
which the member comes for relief to withhold the exercise of its authority
-for four months if reasonable internal procedures are available and are not
earlier exhausted ....
Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1 8 148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
129 Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
130 Id. at 430. There have subsequently been several other Board decisions involving union fines for initiating proceedings before the Board. Local 238, Wood,
Wire & Metal Lathers' Int'l Union, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 61 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1966),
held, in accord with Local 138 and Roberts, that a fine imposed for filing unfair labor
practice charges with the Board was an 8(b) (1) (A) violation. To the same effect
is the decision in Houston Typographical Union, 158 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 62 L.R.R.M.
1174 (1966), where the union imposed the fine in order to defray expenses incurred
in defending the unfair labor practice charges.
Two 1965 Board decisions, although involving expulsion and suspension rather
than fines, attempt to distinguish the Local 138 result from cases of union discipline
for filing decertification petitions with the Board. In Tawas Tube Prods, Inc., 151
N.L.R.B. No. 9, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965), the union expelled members for filing
and supporting a decertification petition. The Board held that this did not interfere
with the employees' freedom of choice so as to warrant setting aside the results of a
representation election, distinguishing the case from Local 138 as follows:
This case, however, presents a situation where union members have resorted
to the Board for the purpose of attacking the very existence of their union
rather than as an effort to compel it to abide by the Act. We do not consider
it beyond the competence of the Union to protect itself in this situation by the
application of reasonable membership rules and discipline. Furthermore, the
employees' attempt to repudiate the Union by a decertification proceeding
demonstrates that loss of membership was of no significance to them; consequently their expulsion from the Union could hardly be an effective deterrent
against resorting to the Board.
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In its next decision, Local 248, UAW,' the Board reaffirmed the
position that fines imposed for filing unfair labor practice charges are
an exception to the rule that fines are internal union affairs and thus
not within the scope of section 8(b) (1) (A). They are an exception
because the rules imposing such fines are "beyond the competence of
the union to enforce since they interfered with the right of union
members to seek redress with the Board through the filing of
charges." 32 In this manner, the Board distinguished Local 138 and
Roberts and held that court-enforced fines imposed upon members of
a union shop for refusal to participate in an economic strike did not
violate section 8(b) (1) (A). After discussing Wisconsin Motor, the
Board stated:
Here, too, the Respondents have properly maintained the
distinction between treatment of the individual as a member
of the Union and treatment of him as an employee. They
have imposed the fine only on their own members. It is not
alleged that the Respondents ever attempted to affect the jobs
or working conditions of any of the fined individuals. Nor
is it alleged that the rule prohibiting members from crossing
a picket line during a strike is not the legitimate concern of
a union or properly the subject matter of internal discipline.
It may be said then that the Respondents were engaged only
in prescribing and enforcing their own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership. 3 '
Member Leedom again dissented:
Yet, my colleagues of the majority revert again to the
reasoning of the Wisconsin Motor case and find no violation
because, in their view, the fined individuals are affected only
in their status as members and not as employees. I think it
will come as a surprise to the affected individual when he is
told that a union fine designed to induce him to respect picket
lines and stay away from his job does not touch him as an
58 L.R.R.M. at 1331. In Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 60
L.R.R.M. 1008 (1965), the Board held that the union was protected by the proviso
to § 8(b) (1) (A) in suspending a member for filing a decertification petition with
the Board, following Tawas. The Board stated that in Tawas
the Board took note of the fundamental distinction between union disciplinary
action aimed at the filing of charges seeking redress for asserted infringement
of statutory rights, as in Skura [Local 138], and union disciplinary action
aimed at defending itself from conduct which seeks to undermine its very
existence.

60 L.R.R.M. at 1009.
131 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), aff'd sub nor . Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept 13, 1965, rev'd on rehearing, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. Wux 3110 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966) (No. 216).
Term; reiiumbered No. 216, 1966 Term).
182 Id. at 69.

133 Ibid.
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employee, but only as a union member. . . , By their decision
here, as well as their decision in Wisconsin Motor, my colleagues seem to say that some protected activities are not
protected from the coercion of a union fine. I see no warrant
for distinguishing in this respect between various kinds of
protected activities ....
"'
In September, 1965, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
handed down a decision in this case in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB. 3 ' This opinion was the first court of appeals decision directly
confronting the lawfulness of court-enforceable union fines (except
for Roberts, which the D.C. Circuit limited to its particular facts), and
it represented a definite victory for the Board:
When Congress was considering the 1947 amendments, it
was well aware of union disciplinary measures, including fines,
for such activities as "strikebreaking."
If Congress had
intended to prohibit such fines-while at the same time permitting expulsion as a disciplinary measure-the intention to
do so could be expected to be clear...
The indications,
however, are to the contrary. 136
The court analyzed the legislative history and decided that section
8(b) (1) was directed against "the specific evils of force, violence,
and threats thereof, mass picketing, and economic reprisal in the form
of inducing an employer to discriminate against an employee in his
job rights" and was not intended to cover "fines collectible by legal
process, which may be described as 'coercive.' " 137 The opinion is
replete with policy arguments:
It would be difficult to accept the proposition that a union
should be the one secular society in our nation which one
may enter without being bound by majority rule and without
submission to some limitations on rights for the common
good. Upon entering, union members must take not only the
benefits but the burdens also . . . and these burdens are not
solely financial. Implicit in the Section 7 right to organize
is the duty, once that right has been exercised, to support
the organization."'
The court stated that its earlier decision in Allen Bradley was not
controlling:
4

73.
No. 14853, 7th Cir., Sept. 13, 1965.
1361d. at 4.
137 Id. at 5.
13 Id. at
135

138 Id. at 8.
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We do not see how, if fining a union member for crossing a
picket line is unlawful coercion, as Allis-Chalmers claims here,
it can be a matter for collective bargaining. Nor can we see
how, if the employer is "concerned" with a union's fining its
members for crossing picket lines, so as to give the employer
a bargainable interest in the matter-one of the principal bases
of the Allen Bradley decision-it can be less "concerned"
over the expulsion of members, which the employer here concedes is lawful."3 9
The Seventh Circuit granted Allis-Chalmers' petition for a rehearing en banc and in March, 1966, by a vote of four to three, the
Two
court reversed itself and found an 8(b) (1) (A) violation. 4
judges from the original panel had, between September and March,
changed their minds; and one of them, Judge Knoch, wrote the
majority opinion on rehearing. The court again partially relied on
policy arguments--ones cutting the other way.14 ' The majority stated
that the original decision did conflict with the holding in Allen Bradley
and explained away any internal inconsistency in that case with the
assertion that "activity already prohibited by statute is not by virtue
of that fact alone barred from further prohibition by a provision in
a contract." " The primary basis upon which the decision rested
was that the words of the statute clearly outlaw the fines in question,
and there is therefore no need to resort to legislative history. 43 Further,
the court stated that the Taft-Hartley legislative history as a whole
is in accord with this reading of the statute.'4 The court was undoubtedly impressed by the fact that the case involved a union shop:
The expressed Congressional policy protecting the union
member is particularly apt where, as in the case before us,
membership is the result not of individual voluntary choice
but of the insertion of a union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of the employees
m y have been forced into membership.4 5
There were three separate dissenting opinions, each centering on
the issue of voluntary union membership. Judge Kiley (who wrote
the three-judge panel opinion) insisted that the issue of forced membership was not before the court:
139 Id. at 9.

14oAllis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
14 1 Id. at 660.
Id. at 661. See note 101 sipra.
Id. at 660.
14 Id. at 661.
142
143

145 Id. at 660.

(Emphasis added.)
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An argument was introduced by Allis-Chalmers in its rehearing petition that the men before us were involuntary
members having "solely a dues paying status," a "very limited
technical" membership. The union's answer to the petition
stated that the union shop clause does not require full union
membership; that the union could not compel employees to
take the union oath, submitting to the union constitution and
rule. The union's answer conceded that if the men before us
had no obligation to the union beyond paying dues and fees,
they would not be subject to the union "requirement of
obedience to the common cause." In reply Allis-Chalmers
shifted gears: "This avoids the question in issue. The question is whether a union may coerce an employee who is a
member, be he one voluntarily or involuntarily. It is the
Petitioner's position that unions have no such right." The
question of involuntariness was not and is not in the case. 46
Regardless of whether the issue was before the court, all three dissenters maintain that the fined employees were "voluntary" union
members who could have protected themselves from internal union
discipline if they had "either rejected full union membership or resigned
from the union."

7
IX. CONCLUSION

It seems that Allis-Chalmers-the most authoritative pronouncement on union fines to date-states the correct result but gives the
wrong reasons. The dissenters to the en banc opinion were quick to
point out the obvious error of refusing to consider the legislative
146 Id at 669.
14"

(Italics in original; footnotes omitted.)

Id. at 671.

A final case shedding some light on § 8(b)(1)(A) as it relates to union fines
is Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966), which held that it
was error for the Regional Director and General Counsel of the Board to refuse the
charging employer an evidentiary hearing on its objections to an informal settlement
agreement executed between the Regional Director and the union. The union activities
inducing the charges included the imposition of fines for refusal to participate in a
strike. The fines equalled the wages earned during the strike, and the union instituted
civil actions to collect them. Necessarily by way of dictum, the Third Circuit stated:
In some instances, as where only the status of the employee as a member of
the union is affected, union fines standing alone may not violate the Act
[citing Wisconsin Motor Corp. and the original Seventh Circuit decision in
Allis-Chalmers]. But to equate union fines with total wages earned by a
non-striking employee is the grossest form of economic coercion affecting
not only union membership status but also the relationship between the employee and his employer in violation of the Act. Such economic coercion is
calculated in design and effect to force an employee to act in concert with
the union in future labor-management strife. Congress has imposed strict
limitation on compulsory unionism, and the Supreme Court has determined
the obligation of union membership to be confined solely to the payment of
dues.
Id. at 536.
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history.14
However, as has been demonstrated,1 49 the legislative
history of section 8(b) (1) (A) demands the result reached by the
court. While there may be room for judicial departure from what
seems to be an absolute prohibition upon court-enforceable union
fines,'
Allis-Chalmers, involving a union shop, was hardly an appropriate case for such a departure. The unsoundness of holding an
employee under a union shop contract responsible for affirmatively
limiting his membership to dues-paying status has already been discussed. 5 ' It therefore seems that, at least under a union shop clause,
a union member should not be held as a matter of law to have waived
his section 7 rights. When a case arises where the fined union member
can be said to have made what was, in reality, a voluntary decision to
avail himself of the privileges of full membership in the union, then,
and only then, should a court begin to consider the creation of a
judicial exception to what seems to be a clear legislative pronouncement that a union may not coerce an employee in the exercise of his
section 7 rights by means of a court-enforceable fine.
Although the Board has not yet been willing to accept the full
force of this pronouncement in section 8(b) (1) (A) proceedings,
complete acceptance of the principle which it put forward in Local 138
and Roberts should lead it to acquiescence in the Allis-Chalmers result.
Granting that the unfettered right to file charges with the Board may
be essential to the Board's effective administration of national labor
legislation, it is difficult to understand why this right is a more important section 7 right'
than the right to refrain from concerted
union activities. Unless a better distinction than that interference
with the right to file charges "run [s] counter to other recognized public
policies" 's can be given, the Board's limitation on this 8(b) (1) (A)
prohibition should fall, and the Board should reconsider the results
it reached in cases such as Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. and
Wisconsin Motor Corp.
148
149

358 F.2d at 671.
Section III supra.

150 Section VII supra.
151 See text accompanying

notes 59-60 supra.

In fact, it does not seem that the right to file charges with the Board is a § 7
right at all.
'53 Note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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